This paper's empirical results indicate that the average effect of antitakeover provisions on subsequent long-term investment is negative. The interpretation of these results depends on whether one thinks that there was too much, too little, or just the right amount of longterm investment prior to the antitakeover provision adoption. We use agency theory to devise more re®ned empirical tests of the effects of antitakeover provision adoption by managers in ®rms with different incentive and monitoring structures. Governance variables (e.g. percentage of outsiders on corporate boards, and separate CEO/chairperson positions) have an insigni®cant impact on subsequent long-term investment behavior. However, consistent with agency theory predictions, managers in ®rms with better economic incentives (higher insider ownership) tend to cut subsequent long-term investment less than managers in ®rms with less incentive alignment. Furthermore, managers in ®rms with greater external monitoring (due to higher institutional ownership) also tend to cut subsequent long-term investment less than managers in ®rms with less external monitoring. Thus, the decrease in subsequent long-term investment is signi®cantly less for ®rms where the managers have greater incentives to act in shareholders' interests. Finally, there are interesting effects of the control variables. First, high book equity/ market equity ®rms cut total long-term investment more. Second, ®rms that were takeover targets or rumored to be takeover targets cut long-term investment more. These results suggest that inef®cient ®rms cut long-term investment more when an antitakeover provision is adopted.
INTRODUCTION
This paper examines the effects on the long-term investment policy of ®rms that introduce antitakeover provisions and examines the determinants of the cross-sectional variation in long-term investment changes. Negative and statistically signi®cant stock price effects of the adoption of an antitakeover provision are well documented.
1 However, the results of prior research on the effects of antitakeover provisions on subsequent long-term investment are ambiguous. 2 In addition, the interpretation of any change in long-term investment after an antitakeover provision adoption is dependent on the researcher's belief about the appropriateness of the level of longterm investment before the antitakeover provision. Therefore, in this paper, we have two objectives. First, we attempt to reconcile the con¯icting empirical results of the effects of antitakeover provisions on subsequent long-term investment. Second, we offer re®ned empirical tests to distinguish among competing theoretical rationales for subsequent changes in these long-term investments.
The empirical results of this paper indicate that ®rms that adopt antitakeover provisions signi®cantly decrease subsequent long-term investment on an industry-adjusted basis. The interpretation of this decline, however, is ambiguous, since we do not know if the ®rms had too little, too much, or just the CCC 0143±6570/97/050349±17 $17.50 # 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. right amount of long-term investment prior to the antitakeover provision adoption. We use agency theory to devise more ®ne-grained empirical tests of the effects of antitakeover provision adoptions. We regress the (industry-adjusted) changes on the observable variables suggested by agency theory. Several of these variables enter the regressions as signi®cant. Firms with higher insider holdings (suggesting better economic incentives) and ®rms with higher institutional holdings (suggesting better monitoring capabilities and incentives) show a signi®cantly smaller decline in long-term expenditures. In addition, those ®rms that were under takeover pressure cut long-term expenditure signi®-cantly more than those ®rms that were not under takeover pressure.
This paper thus demonstrates that corporate governance actions (i.e. antitakeover provision actions) have an impact on subsequent strategic decisions (i.e. long-term investment). Characteristics of the ®rms' ownership structure, which agency theory suggests should align managers' actions with shareholder interests, are important determinants of the behavior of managers of ®rms after the adoption of antitakeover provisions.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides theoretical perspectives on antitakeover provisions and describes the agency theory variables used in this paper. The third section describes the data that are used and the sources of the data. The fourth section discusses this paper's methodology. The ®fth section presents the results of average changes in long-term investment and the crosssectional regressions of the change in long-term investments on ®rm-speci®c characteristics suggested by agency theory. The ®nal section provides a discussion and conclusions.
ANTITAKEOVER PROVISIONS AND THEIR EFFECTS ON LONG-TERM INVESTMENT Theoretical Perspectives
In response to the increase in takeovers in the 1980s, innovations in corporate antitakeover provisions took on a variety of forms, with corporate charter antitakeover amendments and poison pill securities among the most common antitakeover provisions (Blair, 1995; Jarrell and Poulsen, 1987) . This section discusses the major hypotheses on the economic effects of antitakeover provisions. Six antitakeover provisions are examined in this paper: poison pill provisions and ®ve corporate charter antitakeover amendments (supermajority provisions, classi®ed board provisions, fair-price provisions, reduction of cumulative voting provisions, and anti-greenmail provisions). The Appendix gives a brief description of each type of antitakeover provision. From a theoretical perspective, the rationales for the rise of antitakeover provisions from management can be placed into two con¯icting categories: the shareholder welfare hypothesis and the managerial welfare hypothesis. Supporters of the shareholder welfare hypothesis emphasize the dif®culties in managing ®rms for long-term competitiveness while under the constant threat of a takeover. It is argued that the fear of a takeover causes managers to focus their attention too closely on current earnings at the expense of long-term investments. Antitakeover provisions, it is argued, increase the target management's power in negotiating better deals with raiders' whose intentions are to acquire the ®rm's assets at an unreasonably low price. In response to the dif®culties in managing a ®rm while under the constant threat of takeover, responsible managements propose and support antitakeover provisions to facilitate actions that are in the long-run best interests of the ®rm.
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On the other hand, supporters of the management welfare hypothesis warn that insulating managers from competition in the takeover market for corporate control (Manne, 1965) can also have negative effects on long-run competitiveness. Erecting barriers to competition in the market for corporate control may lead to entrenched managers who have decreased incentives for cutting costs, increasing ef®ciency, andaor investing in projects with long lead times. Consequently, the long-run competitiveness of ®rms can be compromised. Critics of antitakeover provisions indicate that these provisions are proposed and supported by opportunistic or inef®cient managers as mechanisms that insulate management from the necessary competition from the takeover market, which, if allowed to function properly, would replace these same managers.
This paper considers the implications of these two competing theoretical perspectives derived from agency theory concerning the causes and effects of antitakeover provisions. The agency theory of the ®rm (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Levinthal, 1988; Mahoney, 1992) highlights the inherent potential for con¯ict in the relation between principals (i.e. the owners of the ®rm) and agents (e.g. top manage-ment). 4 In particular, this paper studies the effects of the adoption of antitakeover provisions on subsequent changes in long-term investment. Speci®c attention is paid to the effects of mechanisms which potentially attenuate the agency problems inherent in the separation of ownership and control, namely, ownership structure and corporate board structure.
Cross-sectional Variations in Changes in
Long-term Investment
It is important to stress that the above hypotheses cannot be used to predict the sign (positive or negative) of the change in long-term investment. The dif®culties in interpreting subsequent changes in long-term investments of ®rms adopting antitakeover provisions stem from the fact that there is no consensus concerning the appropriate level of investment by the ®rm. Two contradictory theories of long-term investment have been put forth in the literature. One theory suggests that an increase in long-term discretionary expenditure leads to positive shareholder wealth, as ®rms take on positive net present value (NPV) projects to the bene®t of shareholders. 5 An opposing theory suggests that increased long-term discretionary spending is associated with decreased shareholder wealth, especially for ®rms with cash¯ows that exceed those required to fund all positive NPV projects.
6 Therefore, given these two opposing views of long-term expenditures, examination of subsequent changes in long-term investment expenditures alone (as previously done by researchers) cannot determine whether the managers are acting in the best interests of shareholders.
A better interpretation of long-term investments by managers after the adoption of an antitakeover provision may be obtained by examining differences in the behavior of managers of ®rms with varying degrees of economic incentives or with varying degrees of board independence. For example, if the managers of a ®rm with high insider holdings (indicative of a high degree of alignment between shareholder and manager incentives) behave differently from the managers with low insider holdings, based on agency theory we can attribute the difference in behavior to the effects of economic alignment. Furthermore, we assume that managers with high insider holdings are acting in the best interests of shareholders, thereby enabling us to test the hypotheses regarding the impact of antitakeover provisions on long-term investments. Similarly, differences in the long-term investment of managers of ®rms with varying degrees of board independence also enable us to interpret the effects of antitakeover provisions on long-term investments.
Therefore, as a more re®ned test of the competing hypotheses we examine the association of ®rm-speci®c characteristics on the cross-sectional variation of changes in long-term investments. This paper assumes that economic incentives and governance structure align the actions of management and the objectives of shareholders. In particular, ®rm-speci®c characteristics are expected to lead to managerial decisions that are closely aligned with shareholder interests (Malekzadeh and McWilliams, 1995) . One potentially important characteristic is the ®rm's ownership structure. One measurement of ownership structure is the percentage of equity owned by top management [INSIDER OWNERSHIP] . Greater insider holdings are expected to lead to decisions that are in the best interest of shareholders, due to the direct wealth impacts on managers when their actions affect share price (Buchholtz and Ribbens, 1994) .
Another measurement of ownership structure is the percentage of equity owned by major institutions in the United States [INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP]. Greater institutional holdings (e.g. public pension funds) are expected to lead to decisions that are in the best interest of shareholders, due to the greater incentive of larger institutions to spend resources to closely monitor ®rm decisions Mandelker, 1990, 1992; Demsetz, 1983; Kochar and Parthiban, 1996; Van Nuys, 1993) . The size of institutional investments, which are typically large, provides institutions with a greater incentive to expend resources to monitor management actively for two reasons. First, they are able to internalize more of the bene®ts from participation in the voting process (Allen, 1993; Aoki, 1984) . Second, given the size of their voting power, institutional investors have a greater potential of in¯uencing the outcome of the voting process (Brickley, Lease and Smith, 1988; Sundaramurthy, 1996) .
Both high insider ownership and high institutional ownership tend to align the behavior of ®rms' management with the shareholders' objectives. Agency theory predicts higher insider holdings and higher institutional holdings lead to more managerial decisions consistent with shareholder wealth maximization.
Another potentially important characteristic of the ®rm that may align the actions of management with the interests of shareholders is the composition of the board of directors (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988; Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand, 1996; Zahra and Pearce, 1989) . 7 Greater independent oversight of managements is expected to lead to managerial decisions more in line with shareholder interests (Daily and Dalton, 1994a,b; Seward and Walsh, 1996) . Agency theory suggests that more independent boards of directors provide better monitoring if management seeks to act opportunistically (Gibbs, 1993; Kosnik, 1990; Zahra, 1991, 1992) . 8 Independent board structure is measured in three ways.
First, the proportion of outsiders (not current or previous executives of the ®rm or its subsidiaries) on the board [OUTSIDER PERCENTAGE] is meant as a proxy for independent oversight of the decision of the board (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990; Davis, 1991; Hoskisson and Turk, 1990; Singh and Harianto, 1989a) . 9 Boards with a higher percentage of outside board members are likely to provide more independent oversight of management.
Second, the proportion of outside members who were not hired during the incumbent CEO's tenure on the corporate board is used as a more ®ne-grained measure of independent outside board representation [PRE-CEO OUTSIDER PERCENTAGE]. Outside directors' allegiances are at least in part a function of how they achieved their board seats (Gordon and Pound, 1993) . Since the independence of outside board members can depend on who nominated them to the corporate board, those board members not nominated during the current CEO's tenure are likely to be more independent of the CEO and current management (Boeker, 1992; Wade, O'Reilly and Chandratat, 1990; Westphal and Zajac, 1994) .
Third, SEPARATE CEOaCHAIRPERSON is a dummy variable set equal to 0 if the CEO and chairperson of the board are the same individual and set equal to 1 if the two positions are held by different individuals. This variable is meant as a proxy for an independent audit of the decisions of management (Berg and Smith, 1978; Boyd, 1995; Finkelstein and D'Aveni, 1994) . Some authors have argued that having the same person act as CEO and chairperson of the board creates a con¯ict of interest in the independent monitoring role of the board (Jensen, 1993; Lorsch and MacIver, 1989; Pi and Timme, 1993; Rechner and Dalton, 1991; Sundaramurthy, Mahoney and Mahoney, 1997) . In serving simultaneously as CEO and chairperson of the board, a CEO should have a greater in¯uence among board members (Mallette and Fowler, 1992) hampering the board's independent monitoring capacity (Beatty and Zajac, 1994) . Therefore, an independent CEO± chairperson structure is more likely to give rise to better monitoring of managerial decisions.
Finally, six control variables are added to the analysis in order to control for their ®rm-speci®c impact that may in¯uence managerial decisions after the adoption of the antitakeover provisions.
First, MARKET VALUE OF EQUITY is included as a control variable, in order to avoid problems in interpreting regression coef®cient estimates. For instance, if managers of smaller ®rms react to antitakeover provisions signi®cantly differently than managers of larger ®rms (perhaps since larger ®rms are less likely targets than smaller ®rms), a correlated variable (such as insider ownership or institutional ownership) may appear signi®cantly related to the subsequent change in long-term investment. If the market value of equity is not included in the regression, such a relationship, if found, could be purely spurious.
Second, the ratio of BOOK VALUE OF EQUITYaMARKET VALUE OF EQUITY is included to capture possible effects of varying degrees of bookamarket ratios (Fama and French, 1993) . Firms with high bookamarket equity behave differently from other ®rms due to their poor past performance, which also may be correlated with the adoption of an antitakeover provision (Lang, Stulz and Walkling, 1989) . The addition of the bookamarket equity variable is intended to capture these differences among various adopting ®rms.
Third, a TAKEOVER INDICATOR, a dummy control variable, is set equal to 1 if the ®rm is reported to be a target (or rumored to be a target) in the ®nancial press in the three years prior to the announcement of the antitakeover provision (Brickley, Lease and Smith, 1988; Datta and Iskandar-Datta, 1996; Ryngaert, 1988; Singh and Harianto, 1989b) . Meulbroek et al. (1990) conjecture that those ®rms that respond to the threat of a takeover by passing an antitakeover provision are more likely to shift expenditures away from longterm investment in their quest to remain independent. For example, ®rms may repurchase shares (Bagwell, 1991) or pay specially designated dividends, especially during a recapitalization (Handa and Radhakrishan, 1991; Willens, 1988) , each of which may shift cash¯ows that would have otherwise gone toward long-term expenditures.
Fourth, a POISON PILL INDICATOR is used as a dummy control variable set equal to 1 if the antitakeover provision was a poison pill. Unlike the other ®ve antitakeover provisions in this paper, the poison pill provision does not require shareholder approval. Walsh and Seward (1990) indicate that: Theoretically, actions taken by management that do not require shareholder approval may be particularly damaging to shareholder interests [when compared to actions that require shareholder approval]' (p. 438). This conjecture is economically intuitive given that agency problems are likely to be higher when shareholders are not provided an opportunity to participate in curbing actions that may be detrimental to them.
Finally, two control variables obtained from the IRRC database are used: the number of antitakeover provisions that the ®rm had adopted previously, before the current provision [NUMBER PREVIOUSLY ADOPTED], and the number of provisions adopted with the current provision [NUMBER CONCURRENTLY ADOPTED]. It is possible that the effect of antitakeover provision adoption is greater when a ®rm has several other antitakeover provisions in place. Similarly, multiple antitakeover provisions adopted simultaneously in the same proxy year may have greater impact on a ®rm's subsequent long-term investment than to those adopted individually (Sundaramurthy, Mahoney and Mahoney, 1997) .
METHODOLOGY
This section explains the methodology used to test the effects that antitakeover provisions have on the subsequent long-term investment decisions of ®rms that adopt them. Three measures of long-term investment are used in this paper: capital expendituresasales, R&Dasales, and the sum of capital expendituresasales and R&Dasales. The raw change in each ratio is de®ned as the difference between the ratio 3 years after the antitakeover provision and the ratio 1 year before the antitakeover provision:
where RATIO i,t is the ratio for ®rm i in year t (t 71 or t 3) and where t 0 corresponds to the year in which the ®rm adopts the antitakeover provision. Three years after the antitakeover provision initiation are used to allow for long-term effects of the antitakeover provision to in¯uence such`sticky' items as capital expenditures (Meulbroek et al., 1990) . The raw changes in the ratios, however, may be misleading if industry-wide changes in these ratios occurred. Therefore, these ratios are adjusted by the mean of the changes for ®rms in the same industry.
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For the industry adjustment for ®rm i, the mean ratio at time t of ®rms in the same industry as ®rm i is used:
where RATIO iYt represents the mean ratio at time t of ®rms in the same two-digit SIC code as ®rm i.
11 The average industry-adjusted ratio is then constructed as
where N represents the number of ®rms in our sample. We then regress this average industryadjusted change in long-term investment on the various ®rm characteristics that are suggested by agency theory to be important in aligning managerial behavior with shareholder wealth, and include various control variables described above: (Rosenbaum, 1989) . In this period, the takeover wave of the 1980s peaked (Davis and Stout, 1992) . The sample begins in 1984 to mark the initial adoption of the poison pill. The accuracy of IRRC's data is high with respect to corporate charter antitakeover provisions (Pound, 1992a, p. 663) . The original proxy statements were examined in order to obtain the precise proxy mailing date for the antitakeover amendments. For the poison pill provisions, which have no corresponding proxy statements since shareholder approval is not required, the ®rst public announcement date is taken from Corporate Control Alert, a monthly newsletter produced by AmLaw Publishing Corporation reports the date that shareholders were noti®ed that the board decided to adopt a poison pill provision. (This publication is the source for poison pill provisions referenced in Ryngaert, 1988 and Malatesta and Walkling, 1988.) Insider holdings are found in the proxy statement describing the antitakeover amendment or in the proxy statement before the initiation of the poison pill. The separate CEOaChairperson status and board composition were also determined by the same proxy statement. Institutional ownership was found using the Standard and Poor's Stock Guide in the monthend prior to the antitakeover provision initiation. The Wall Street Journal Index was examined for the three years before, the year of, and the three years after the initiation of the antitakeover provision in order to determine whether the ®rm was the target (or rumored to be the target) of a takeover or merger. The market value of equity is determined using CRSP's shares outstanding and stock price, and book value of equity is taken from Compustat using the (®scal) year-end prior to the initiation of the antitakeover provision. Industry classi®cations (SIC codes), sales, research & development expenditures, and capital expenditures are taken from Compustat. The number of observations in the tables of this paper varies slightly depending on data availability. Table 1 gives the correlation matrix of the independent variables. While there is signi®cant correlation between the control variables and the independent variables suggested by agency theory (outside board composition, fraction of outside board members appointed before the arrival of the current CEO, separate CEOachairperson indicator, insider ownership and institutional ownership), the only agency theory variable that is signi®cantly correlated with other agency theory variables is the PRE-CEO OUTSIDER PERCENTAGE. In order to test the robustness of this paper's results and to ensure that this paper's results are not due to the correlation between the control variables and agency theory variables, we run the regressions with and without the control variables, and with and without the variable PRE-CEO OUTSIDER PERCENTAGE. These robustness tests are particularly important due to recent empirical ®ndings that there are interdependencies among various corporate control mechanisms (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1995; Rediker and Seth, 1995; Sundaramurthy, 1996) .
RESULTS
Average Effects on Subsequent Long-term Investment Table 2 shows the industry-adjusted sample means and their associated t-statistics for the two ratios under consideration. Firms that adopt antitakeover provisions decrease signi®cantly both capital expenditure intensity (by one-half of one percent) and R&D intensity (by almost one percent) relative to their industry average after the adoption of antitakeover provisions.
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The result of a decrease in research and development supports the ®ndings of Meulbroek et al. (1990) , but contradicts the ®ndings of Pugh, Page and Jahera (1992) , who use a different measure of change in long-term investment. Instead of using the mean difference in ratios, Pugh, Page and Jahera (1992) use a mean percentage change in the ratios, which is equivalent to weighting the difference in ratios inversely by the beginning ratio. Firms that adopt antitakeover provisions have lower capital expenditure intensity and lower R&D intensity ratios before the takeover defense initiation, therefore potentially biasing the statistical test in favor of the results that Pugh, Page and Jahera (1992) report. In other words, the discovery of a difference in percentage changes in long-term investment intensities between the sample and the control may have been an artifact of the differences in original investment intensity levels. The ®ndings of Mallette (1991) of no signi®cant impact of antitakeover provisions on long-term investment may be the result of a different test methodology (non-industry adjusted) and of a smaller sample size, since the period covered in Mallette (1991) is 1983±4, while the current paper covers the period 1984±8.
This empirical test alone tells us very little about the appropriateness of the decline in long-term investment. However, we can use the cross-sectional changes in long-term investment to determine, Table 3 shows the OLS estimates and t-statistics from the regressions of changes in long-term expenditures on the variables suggested by agency theory and the various control variables described above. The regression of change in total long-term investment, as measured by the sum of capital expenditureasales and R&Dasales, is reported in panel A of Table 3 . In addition, long-term investment, as measured by each component of this sum, capital expendituresasales and R&Dasales, are reported in panels B and C of Table 3 , respectively. In the test of total long-term investment changes, panel A of Table 3 shows that the coef®cient on INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP enters as positive and signi®cant (t-statistic of 2.397), indicating that ®rms with higher institutional ownership tend to cut long-term investment less than ®rms with low institutional ownership. This result is consistent with the predictions of agency theory, that ®rms that are better monitored by large institutional investors behave differently after the adoption of antitakeover provisions. Given our assumption based on agency theory that institutional investors are more effective monitors of management, the lower decrease in long-term investment for ®rms with higher institutional investment supports the idea that antitakeover provisions have negative effects on longterm investment decisions. However, the coef®cient on the INSIDER OWNERSHIP variable, while positive, is not signi®cant. None of the board composition variables enter the regression as signi®cant.
In addition, two control variables enter the regression as signi®cant. The negative coef®cient on the ratio BOOK EQUITYaMARKET EQUITY (with a t-statistic of À3.289) indicates that ®rms with high book equityamarket equity ratios (and therefore are probably performing poorly due to inef®ciency) tend to cut long-term investment more than ®rms with low book equityamarket equity ratios. The negative coef®cient on the TAKEOVER INDICATOR (with t-statistic of À2.512) suggests that those ®rms with takeover threats or rumors of takeover threats around the adoption of the antitakeover provision tend to cut long-term investment more than those ®rms without such takeover threats. This empirical ®nding is consistent with Meulbroek et al.'s (1990) conjecture that ®rms that are under takeover threat continue to feel such pressure and consequently cut long-term investment. Table 3 also lists the results for the regressions run on the two components of long-term investment. First, panel B of Table 3 shows that, when long-term investment is proxied by capital expendituresasales, only the coef®cient on NUMBER CONCURRENTLY ADOPTED enters as signi®cant (with a t-statistic of À3.834). The negative coef®cient indicates that the larger the number of antitakeover provisions that are adopted at one time, the greater the subsequent fall in capital expenditures to sales. Neither the ownership structure nor board structure variables enter the regression as signi®cant.
Second, panel C of Table 3 shows the results of the regression when long-term expenditures are proxied by research and development to sales. The only coef®cient that is signi®cant in this regression is the INSIDER OWNERSHIP variable, which is positive (with a t-statistic of 2.151).
13 This regression result indicates that the greater the insider ownership before the antitakeover provision is adopted, the less the ®rm cuts subsequent long-term investment. The positive sign of the coef®cient is consistent with the positive coef®cient on the INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP variable from the overall regression: Managers in ®rms that have ownership structures which theoretically align managerial action with shareholder interests decrease subsequent long-term investment less than managers in ®rms without such ownership structures. Again, none of the board composition variables is signi®cant. The three panels of Table 3 show a mixed, but fairly consistent, picture of the effects of the adoption of antitakeover provisions. An increased economic alignment between management and shareholders leads to a smaller decrease in long-term expenditures following the adoption of an antitakeover provision. In other words, the increased alignment due to higher insider and institutional ownership leads to a consistent effect of a smaller decrease in long-term investment following the antitakeover provision adoption. Thus, we interpret the decrease in long-term investment subsequent to the adoption of antitakeover provisions as contrary to stockholders' interests.
On the other hand, board composition variables (the fraction of outside members, fraction hired before the CEO took of®ce, and the separate CEOachairperson indicator) do not enter signi®cantly into any of the regressions.
14 Therefore, the governance variables appear to have an insigni®cant in¯uence on the longterm investment decisions of management after the adoption of an antitakeover provision.
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In summary, greater insider and institutional holdings can signi®cantly mitigate the tendency of ®rms that are recently protected by antitakeover provisions to decrease subsequent expenditures on long-term investment. However, agency theory does not explain completely why there is a subsequent decrease in average long-term expenditures. One possible explanation, consistent with our ®ndings, is that pursuing long-term investments requires signi®-cant time and resources on the part of management. A warranted interpretation is that management is less likely to expend these resources when it is protected by antitakeover provisions unless there are economic incentives (such as greater insider holdings) or alternate monitoring mechanisms (such as greater institutional holdings).
Robustness Tests
Several tests for robustness are performed. The choice of mean or median for the industry adjustment does not change the qualitative results. An additional concern is that these performance measures are a function of the size of the ®rm. For instance, if small ®rms show a systematically different growth rate in these measures, then the use of a mean industry adjustment may bias the conclusions if the size of the ®rms in the sample is not comparable to the industry average. The analysis was performed using a control group of ®rms of similar size to ®rms in the sample (with sales used as a proxy for size), and comparable conclusions were reached. Firms that initiated corporate antitakeover provisions decreased subsequent long-term investment on an industry-adjusted and size-adjusted basis. In order to test for the robustness of the crosssectional results, the regressions reported in Table 3 were conducted without the correlated control variables, and the control variables were added one at a time for alternate speci®cations of the regression. In addition, the regressions are performed with and without each of the correlated independent variables, OUTSIDER PERCENTAGE and PRE-CEO OUTSIDER PERCENTAGE. These alternate regressions produce similar results, where ownership variables enter as signi®cant in the positive direction, and governance variables do not enter as signi®cant in any of the tests that were performed.
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The takeover wave of the 1980s resulted in a large number of intra-industry mergers (e.g. in the oil and airline industries) and had a profound impact on the structure of corporate America (Hat®eld, Liebeskind and Opler, 1996; Shleifer and Vishny, 1991) . Antitakeover provisions adopted in the 1980s were an adaptive response by managers to cope with this merger wave. These antitakeover provisions resulted in considerable controversy at the federal, state, and ®rm level (Berkovitch, Bradley and Khanna, 1989; Jahera and Pugh, 1991) . Antitakeover provisions are worthy of continued research attention as the longrun strategic impacts of these antitakeover provisions are still open to debate. This paper explores the changes in the long-term investment of ®rms that adopted antitakeover provisions over the period 1984±8. The hypothesis that antitakeover provisions allow managers of protected ®rms to turn their attention from potential acquirers in order to concentrate on long-term investment is examined. Firms that adopted these antitakeover provisions subsequently reduce long-term expenditures, as measured by capital expenditure and R&D expenditures as a percent of sales.
In addition, this paper is one of the ®rst to explore the cross-sectional variation of changes in long-term expenditures to the adoption of antitakeover provisions. The decline in these expenditures is related to variables posited by agency theory, suggesting that alternate monitoring mechanisms, such as insider holdings and institutional holdings, play key roles in keeping the actions of management aligned with the interests of outside shareholders. Pound (1992b) , reviewing the effects of antitakeover provisions at the state and individual ®rm level, argues,`It is widely agreed that the result [of takeover impediments] is the virtual elimination of the so-called``market for corporate control'' that de®ned the corporate governance debate and occupied the focus of much of corporate law during the 1980s.' While the elimination of the takeover market may be an extreme interpretation of the events of the last decade, the rise in antitakeover provisions has undoubtedly raised the transaction costs involved in the takeover arena. Just as the emergence of the tender offer has been linked to changes in the proxy contest rules at the federal and state levels in the 1950s and 1960s (Jarrell and Bradley, 1980; Pound, 1992a) , the decline in the tender offers in the late 1980s and early 1990s may be the result of the increase in state, federal, and corporate antitakeover provisions. This increase in antitakeover provisions has most probably encouraged the rise in alternative monitoring mechanisms, particularly the growth in the`political' mechanisms of shareholder activism (Pound, 1992b) , in the past ®ve years. However, since these alternate mechanisms were formerly too expensive to implement when takeovers were easier to accomplish, one might wonder whether the rise in antitakeover provisions has predominantly shielded the top management of ®rms from a disciplinary device that is vital and is, at least in some cases, least costly.
Perhaps the most important ®nding of this paper is that governance actions (in this case, adoptions of antitakeover provisions) impact subsequent strategic long-term investment decisions. The data presented in this paper suggest that antitakeover provisions play a signi®cant role in the subsequent decrease in longterm investment. Furthermore, disciplinary and incentive mechanisms, such as institutional and insider holdings, protect the long-term interest of shareholders by mitigating apparently unwarranted reductions in long-term investment.
APPENDIX: DEFINITIONS OF ANTITAKEOVER PROVISIONS
Supermajority provisions typically increase the shareholder approval requirement for a merger to the 66±80% range, thus superseding the approval requirement of the charter of the state in which the ®rm is incorporated (Linn and McConnell, 1983) . Supermajority requirements may block a bidder from implementing a merger even when the bidder controls the target's board of directors, if the bidder's ownership remains below the speci®ed percentage requirement (McWilliams, 1990) . Supermajority provisions raise the cost of a hostile takeover and encourage potential bidders to deal directly with the target ®rm's board of directors, which typically has the option to waive the provision if a majority of directors approves the merger (a so-called`board-out provision'). Pure supermajority provisions would seriously limit the management's¯exibility in takeover negotiations.
Classi®ed (or staggered) board provisions typically segment the board of directors into three classes of which only one is elected each year (DeAngelo and Rice, 1983; Lauterbach, Malitz and Vu, 1991) . With a classi®ed board provision, a new majority shareholder would be forced to wait for two annual meetings before being guaranteed a successful proposal for a merger. Amendments to classify the board are often accompanied by an amendment specifying that supermajority approval by shareholders is required to change the number of directors. This accompanying supermajority provision prevents a bidder from expanding the board and thus controlling the board by electing candidates to the newly created positions. These proposals often describe the bene®ts of`continuity' of board members as the main advantage of classi®ed boards (Mahoney, 1994; Sundaramurthy, 1992; Sundaramurthy, Rechner and Wang, 1996) .
Fair-price provisions restrict the transfer of control of a ®rm if the bidder does not offer a`fair' price, usually de®ned as the highest price paid by the bidder for any shares acquired in the target ®rm during a speci®ed time period or as some premium over the market price (Herzel and Shepro, 1990; Jarrell and Poulsen, 1987) . These amendments require supermajority voting approval by shareholders for transfer of control if the fair-price requirement is not met. Fair-price amendments are mainly effective against hostile two-tier tender offers, where the bidding ®rm offers an attractive price for a ®xed percentage of shares with the (stated or implicit) intention of paying a lower price to the minority shareholders if the initial bid is successful. Hostile bidders can avoid the supermajority requirement of the fair-price amendment by making a uniform offer for all outstanding shares at a price at least as great as the`fair' price, as de®ned in the amendment.
Reduction in cumulative voting provisions restrict the rights of shareholders to accumulate their votes in support of a particular director or group of directors (Bhagat and Brickley, 1984) . With cumulative voting, the number of votes to which a shareholder is entitled is the number of shares owned multiplied by the number of directors to be elected in a given year. Under this structure, it is possible for minority shareholders to elect some board members even if the majority of shareholders opposes their election. A reduction in cumulative voting rights thus reduces the minority's ability to elect their nominees as directors. This change makes the ®rm a less desirable takeover target, because a bidder is not guaranteed representation on the board of directors, and any subsequent in¯uence or information advantages, if the bid is not successful in obtaining a majority of shares.
Anti-greenmail provisions prohibit the ®rm's management from paying raiders`greenmail', which involves the private repurchase of blocks of company stock, usually at a sizeable premium above market price, in exchange for an agreement by the raider not to acquire the ®rm (Bhagat and Jefferis, 1991; Duggal and Cudd, 1993; Klein and Rosenfeld, 1988; McChesney, 1993) . While greenmail is undoubtedly an antitakeover measure, anti-greenmail provisions can also be employed as antitakeover devices. Greenmail can be viewed as payment to bidders for the transaction costs involved in the administrative, information, search and trading costs involved in the takeover procedure. Eliminating the possibility of this form of payment in cases of failed takeover attempts may discourage potential bidders from considering the ®rm for a takeover (Mikkelson and Ruback, 1991) . Typical anti-greenmail charter provisions prohibit the ®rm from repurchasing some or all of the common stock of a shareholder who owns 5% or more of the outstanding common stock and who acquired this ownership within the past three years (Eckbo, 1990) . Since anti-greenmail provisions reduce the bidder's ability to appropriate gains in the case of a failed takeover, the provision may reduce the probability of a takeover attempt (Rosenbaum, 1987) .
Poison pill provisions are the most recent and perhaps the most controversial of the antitakeover provisions. Poison pill provisions provide target shareholders the right to purchase additional shares at a discount or to sell shares to the target at a premium if certain ownership changes occur, such as the acquisition of a speci®ed percentage of the ®rm's shares by a bidder considered hostile by current management (Comment and Schwert, 1995; Loh, 1994; MacMinn and Cook, 1991) . The target shareholder's right to purchase shares at a discount is known as a`¯ip-over plan' (Malatesta and Walkling, 1988) . The right to sell shares at a premium is known as a`back end plan' (Choi, Kamma and Weintrop, 1989; Ryngaert, 1988) . The poison pill is considered the most potentially harmful antitakeover measure since shareholder approval is not required to adopt poison pill provisions and management has full discretion in determining when the poison pill provision is applicable (Walsh and Seward, 1990) .
NOTES
1. For the negative shareholder wealth effects of corporate antitakeover amendments, see Ackhigbe and Madura (1996) , Bhagat and Brickley (1984) , Jarrell and Poulsen (1987) , Eckbo (1990) , Mahoney and Mahoney (1993) , and Mahoney, Sundaramurthy and Mahoney (1996) , and for the negative shareholder wealth effects of poison pill provisions, see Malatesta and Walkling (1988) , Ryngaert (1988) , Choi, Kamma and Weintrop (1989) , and Mahoney, Sundaramurthy and Mahoney (1996) . Only DeAngelo and Rice (1983) and Linn and McConnell (1983) , which study adoptions of antitakeover amendments prior to 1980, ®nd insigni®cant effects. MacKinlay (1997) provides a review of event study methodology. 2. Meulbroek et al. (1990) , using sample data from 1979 to 1985, conclude that R&D intensity declines after an antitakeover provision adoption. Mallette (1991) , using sample data from 1983 to 1984, concludes that no signi®cant change in capital expenditure and R&D intensity can be determined after antitakeover provision adoption. Finally, Pugh, Page and Jahera (1992), using sample data over the 1979±85 period, ®nd that capital expenditures and R&D intensity rose signi®-cantly after the adoption of an antitakeover provision. 3. Stein (1988) formally develops a model in which management, acting in the best interests of shareholders, is forced to focus on short-term stock price changes (and thus exhibits`managerial myopia'). In this asymmetric information model, competitors have better information about the value of the ®rm than shareholders, and will attempt to take the ®rm over if the share price falls below the`true' unobservable value of the ®rm. Without antitakeover provisions in place, the ®rm managers engage in costly`signalling' of their true value by forgoing pro®table long-term projects in order to raise short-term earnings. With antitakeover provisions in place, takeover threats are reduced (since the acquirer would be forced to deal directly with management in a takeover situation) and managers can concentrate on increasing the amount of pro®table, long-term investment. 4. Agency costs in the corporation, as de®ned by Jensen and Meckling (1976) , are the difference between the value of a ®rm if monitoring of management were costless and the value of the ®rm as actually operated. 5. In support of this theory, empirical research indicates that stock prices rise with announcements of increased investment expenditures and decline with announcements of reduced investment expenditures (McConnell and Muscarella, 1985; Woolridge and Snow, 1990 ). 6. In support of this hypothesis, Jensen (1986) for example, notes that mechanisms that tend to decrease discretionary funds of the ®rm, such as debt and dividends payments, tend to lead to increased share prices, while mechanisms that increase discretionary funds, such as equity issues and decreases in cash dividend payments, lead to decreased share prices. 7. This paper holds that:`the board of directors should be regarded primarily as a governance structure safeguard between the ®rm and owners of equity capital, and secondarily as a way by which to safeguard the contractual arrangement between the ®rm and its management' (Williamson, 1985: 298) .
8. Some recent empirical evidence (but by no means all) is consistent with agency theory predictions. Kosnik (1987) ®nds that outside directors resisted greenmail more effectively. Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) ®nd that ®rms add outsiders to their board following poor performance. Weisbach (1988) and Warner, Watts and Wruck (1988) ®nd that outside directors are more likely than insider directors to dismiss CEOs following poor economic performance. Kesner and Johnson (1990) discover that boards sued for failing to maintain their ®duciary duty tended to have a low proportion of outside directors. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) ®nd a positive stock price reaction at the announcement of the appointment of an additional outside director. Byrd and Hickman (1992) state that in the case of tender offers, better shareholder returns for the acquirer are associated with boards of directors in which at least half the members are independent outside directors. Brickley, Coles and Terry (1994) provide evidence that the enactment of poison pills leads to a positive stock price reaction when the majority of the board consists of outsiders, and a negative stock price reaction when the majority of the board consists of insiders. This evidence suggests that outside directors serve the interests of shareholders. 9. Reputational concerns and fear of lawsuits motivate outside directors to represent shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 1983a,b; Kaplan and Reishaus, 1990) . Williamson (1996) does not disagree but submits that:`outside directors often have stronger incentives to`go along'' (p. 175), in which case the differential impact of outsiders may be attenuated. 10. The choice of raw changes or industry-adjusted changes makes little difference in the conclusion of overall changes in long-term investment of ®rms adopting antitakeover provisions, and leads to no change in the sign or signi®cance in the regressions presented below. Results with the (À1, 1) and (À1, 2) windows were equal in sign but insigni®cant, consistent with the conjecture of 'sticky' long-term investment expenditures. 11. The use of two, three-or four-digit SIC code industries does not signi®cantly alter the results (consistent with Meulbroek et al., 1990; Pugh, Page and Jahera, 1992) . 12. The sample size for industry-adjusted change in capital expenditures to sales is 390, while the sample size for industry-adjusted change in research and development expenditures to sales is 175. The large loss in sample size is due to the fact that many ®rms (such as those in the retail and service sectors) do not have R&D expenditures. This reduction in sample size should not bias the paper's results because our sample contains the whole universe of companies that report research and development expenditures. The interpretation of the results of this paper, therefore, is only relevant to those companies with such long-term investments, which is implicit in our analysis (i.e. we are only studying the effects on longterm investment on those companies that engage in longterm investment). We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting that we make this idea clear. 13. Two right-hand side variables were added to the regression to capture possible non-linearities (McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1988 Kosnik and Turk, 1991; Johnson, Hoskisson and Hitt, 1993; Kesner, Victor and Lamont, 1986; Mallette and Fowler, 1992) . These empirical results are consistent with the argument that the strength of commitment of outside directors with shareholder interests is weak (Gordon and Pound, 1993; Mace, 1986; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Williamson, 1975 Williamson, , 1996 . This paper's results are also consistent with empirical ®ndings of no relationship between separate CEOachairperson positions and performance (e.g. Baliga, Moyer and Rao, 1996; Brickley, Coles and Jarrell, 1995; Chaganti, Mahajan and Sharma, 1985; Daily and Dalton, 1992) . 15. This paper's results that governance variables have an insigni®cant impact may not be considered particularly surprising since the corporate board typically does not suggest long-term investment strategies but only rati®es or vetoes management's proposals. 16. The breakdown of ®rms adopting multiple provisions is as follows: 21 occurrences of ®rms adopting three provisions simultaneously, 71 occurrences of ®rms adopting two provisions simultaneously, and 281 occurrences of ®rms adopting single provisions. If a single ®rm adopts provisions in different years, each adoption is considered an independent event. The paper's analysis currently provides the results of weighted means and weighted regression analyses, with weights proportional to the number of provisions concurrently adopted (weights equal to 1, 2, or 3), thereby giving a greater weight to those observations with a greater number of provisions adopted. We perform a separate regression analysis on the 281 ®rms that adopted single provisions. The results of the entire sample are robust to this restriction, with one exception: institutional holdings do not enter as signi®cant in the regression of total long-term investment to sales. The other signi®cant results (the sign and signi®cance of the book-to-market and takeoverindicator variables in the regression of total longterm investmentasales, and the sign and signi®cance of the insider-ownership variable in the regression of research-and-developmentasales) are maintained in the restricted regression. We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
